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Abstract: The research paper presents institutional systems of economies in the 
following transforming countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. The article aims at indicating the changes which 
have taken place in informal institutions' structures since the early nineties. It also 
attempts to determine how informal institutions are supporting formal institutions. 
Heading towards building new institutional systems, transforming countries face 
a barrier of slowly evolving informal institutions. A mismatch between institutional 
structures can be noticed in transforming countries. Low level of trust in people, 
resistance to new ideas, strong attachment to traditional behavioural patterns and 
excessive role of “connections”, relatively low level of self-expression, high expec-
tations towards the state and its welfare functions, and low social activity within the 
society, can be observed. The institutional changes in informal components have 
been presented using data from World Values Survey, CEPII and G.Hofstede re-
search. 
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Introduction 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990’s the institutional systems in Central Euro-
pean and Baltic countries have experienced radical transformations. Change 
occurred throughout the whole spectrum of political and economic institu-
tions. The transformations in the subsystems of formal and informal institu-
tions did not take place all at once. While the changes in the former occurred 
relatively quickly, informal institutions evolved slowly, as is their nature, 
thus becoming a barrier in effective operations of institutional system of 
transition countries. As the formal institutions grew more similar to each 
other, Central European and Baltic countries adapted the approach of more 
developed countries. Informal institutions should also be expected to evolve 
in order to adapt to the administered constitutional approach.  
In this light it seems necessary to indicate the changes in informal institu-
tions which occurred in transition economies. It is important to determine 
whether these institutions complement the established formal institutions, for 
their common, one-way impact on economic activity allows achieving 
a more effective economy, measured by the dynamics of its GDB or GDP 
per capita.  
 
 
Methodology of the research 
 
This article will undertake the issue of the incongruity between informal 
institutions and formal institutions in Central European and Baltic countries. 
The study covered selected elements of informal institutional systems of 
Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia.  
Informal institutions were analysed using S. Kirdina’s concept of an insti-
tutional matrix. It highlights those institutions which are specific for market 
economies, or the so called Y matrix institutions. These institutions usually 
comprise of formal (which generally are constituted, registered, and sanc-
tioned by the state), and informal institutions (formed spontaneously in soci-
ety, unwritten rules). The informal institutions are more difficult to capture. 
They are not incorporated or codified. The informal institutions often include 
ideological institutions, such as an individualistic approach or the subsidiari-
ty principle. In a market economy, support for formal institutions comes 
from dominant values such as freedom, expansiveness, openness to change, 
novelty, creativity and originality (Kirdina 2010, p. 9). As such attitudes 
grow in strength, as these values are more firmly rooted in the minds of indi-
viduals and societies, they become a more durable support for the operations 
of economic and political institutions, which form the base of market econ-
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omies. The analysis evaluates social attitudes towards freedom, individual-
ism, traditionalism, expressiveness, and confidence. 
The aim of the undertaken considerations is to indicate the changes which 
have taken place in selected informal institutions of transition countries since 
the beginning of the 1990’s. This will allow to determine whether these 
changes go in the direction observed in highly developed countries.  The 
analysis of informal institutions of selected countries is based on the results 
of qualitative surveys conducted in the framework of World Values Survey, 
CEPII, and conducted by G. Hofstede.   
 
 
Informal institutions  
in the economic system 
 
In transition countries, constituted institutions were changed relatively 
quickly, although not every country could boast about the same effective-
ness. Delaying changes or their gradual implementations would also mean 
the postponement of any benefits they brought. “The more of these reforms 
accumulate, and, of course, the earlier they do, the better for the develop-
ment of the economy.” (Balcerowicz 2010, p. 8). The countries which ceased 
its reforms, or introduced them more slowly, reported an increasing “institu-
tional distance” compared to the countries which transformed faster (Rapac-
ki 2009, p. 205). The speed of changes of the institutional subsystems in 
particular countries also varied. Intrinsically, informal institutions evolved, 
and are evolving more slowly. However, even here there have been noticea-
ble changes in the last 20 years, which could indicate of an acceleration of 
the adaptation process. Transformations of institutions as well as their mutu-
al adjustments are necessary to achieve a coherent, complete, efficient and 
balanced system. Such changes are fundamental factor of economic devel-
opment (Wilkin 2007, p. 41). However, the problem lies in the fact that in-
formal institutions are uncontrollable, and do not surrender easily to being 
transformed in a desired direction. It is difficult to indicate the factors affect-
ing their transformation. The evolution of informal institutions is inscribed in 
the process of development of society, and the shaping of its consciousness. 
They are endogenic, and its players – the participants of economic processes, 
also influence their development. 
Institutions are strongly embedded in the past, and that they have multi-
lateral interactions. This makes a simultaneous change of all institutional 
elements impossible. The situation is especially visible when observing the 
transformations of formal institutions and the evolution of informal compo-
nents of institutional systems. While formal institutions can be changed rela-
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tively quickly, transformation of their informal components takes place 
slowly, and they are hard to plan or direct. Informal institutions are “socially 
shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and en-
forced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke, Levitsky 2004, 
p. 727). They are inseparable with cultural changes.  The inertia of the sub-
system of informal components becomes a peculiar barrier for the effective-
ness of the institutional system. The conflict between the two constituents of 
the system: formal and informal institutions inhibits the functioning of the 
whole setup. It can cause inactivity of or changes  in informal institutions 
(Lissowska 2008, p. 93). The transaction costs of such institutional recon-
struction will rise, adverse activities, corruption, and tax fraud strengthen 
(Fidrmuc, Gërxhani 2008, p. 266). 
It should be good to indicate those informal institutions which support 
market economy. Their identification is possible thanks to an analysis of 
institutional systems of highly developed countries, which have built suc-
cessful setups. S. Kiridina’s theory of institutional matrix indicates ideologi-
cal institutions, which are one of the three complementary groups, next to 
economic and political institutions. The author presents the institutional ap-
proaches characteristic of countries with an X matrix (centralized econo-
mies) and Y matrix (market economies). Among the ideological institutions 
specific to the Y matrix there are: individualism, diversity, freedom (Kirdina 
2010, p. 9). Bernard Chavance points to numerous informal institutions 
whose impact on the economy is important enough for them to be subjected 
to research. Specifically, he focuses on such phenomena as corruption, tax 
evasion, informal economy, cronyism, but also trust, business ethics, infor-
mal cooperation (Chavance 2008, p. 57). In his research, Pasquale Tridico 
used an index of persistence of informal institutions, by which he measured 
the scale of people’s attachment to old rules, resistance and inertia to institu-
tional change, or the phenomenon of rent-seeking (Tridico 2006, p. 204). 
Informal institutions are an important, albeit hard to study, element of the 
institutional order. They are a development of accepted and adopted systems 
of values. Changes in the hierarchy of values influence unwritten rules, and 
later the creation of a more formalized order. Legal regulations, general or 
particular, should be established on the basis of fundamental values. There 
is, of course, a visible influence of formal institutions on informal rules of 
behaviour. 
Complementary informal institutions strengthen the activity of formal 
components of the system and allow for an efficient operation of the whole. 
In such case they form a strong system – an effective mechanism supporting 
the economy, providing intense stimuli that enhance economic activity and 
innovativeness. Achieving a specific institutional balance is a condition for 
a high-performing economy. 
     
Changes in Informal Institutions in Poland and…     43 
 
Complementarities of institutions? 
 
The changes which occurred in the Central European countries turned out to 
be a good observation field for accelerated changes of basic constituted insti-
tutions which form the market along with its environment, allowing an effec-
tive execution of law and constructing an efficient regulatory mechanism. As 
D. Rodrik points out, creating an efficient market economy requires the crea-
tion of several groups of significant institutions (Rodrik 2011, pp. 208-215): 
 well protected property rights – these generate stimuli towards a dynamic 
economic activity, encouraging asset rotation and accumulation of value; 
 regulatory institutions – regulate and improve the functioning of the 
economy; 
 institutions for macroeconomic stabilization – decrease the threat of fi-
nancial and economical stress and facilitate the economic process;  
 institutions for social insurance – protect social groups from negative 
consequences of stratification of profit; 
 institutions of conflict management – decrease transaction costs, increase 
the expansiveness of entities, and therefore develop entrepreneurship.  
Thanks to these fundaments, the economy is able to gradually expand its 
development potential, to generate increasing profits, and to decrease the 
development distance. In Central European countries most of these changes 
were introduced over a short period of time and they were transplanted from 
highly developed economies. It was assumed that the time required for es-
tablishing individual constituted institutions, correspondent to slowly chang-
ing institutions deeply rooted in culture, would be too long, and its success 
rather uncertain and far from perfection. Therefore, changes were introduced 
at one time so that they could become construction elements of a new eco-
nomic mechanism as fast as possible. Then came the difficult process of 
mutual adjustment of institutions. The functions of newly constituted institu-
tions and the successful stimuli they generated still faced much difficulty. 
Fast changes in formal institutions was accompanied by degradation of un-
written rules and dynamic emergence of new, non-codified institutions 
(Chavance 2008, p. 65).  
The construction of formal components omitted its incompatibilities with 
informal institutions. The speed of reforms was more important than a per-
fect incorporation of constituted institutions into the existing informal insti-
tutions. These unwritten rules formulate the behaviour of individuals and 
groups – they are automated and often non-conscious regulators of social 
life. Facing still relatively weak formal institutions, opportunistic behaviours 
emerged. “Institutions built upon wishful and not actual relations between 
individuals and groups cannot function well, if only because intellectual 
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constructs, not verified in real life, reveal numerous, often deeply harmful, 
unforeseen consequences” (Winiecki 2010, p. 162). 
Transition countries do not find it easy to uproot the attitudes that weak-
ened the functioning of the young institutional system – informal institutions 
vestigial to the communist system – the patron – client order, amoral fami-
lism, corporatism (Małecki-Tepicht 2005, p. 49). Societies still retained in-
formal ties between people, which strongly influenced their activities. In 
Poland we call it “znajomość” (connections), in Russia “blat”, in Hungary 
“recombinant”, in China “guanxi”. These relatively formidable institutions 
functioned with newly established unwritten rules. Also, it was possible to 
observe their fast downfall (Chavance 2008, pp. 65-66). On the other hand, 
the gaps in formal institutions are filled relatively quickly with destructive 
informal institutions. Their use contributes to increasing the profits of indi-
viduals or certain groups at the expense of others (Puffer, McCarthy, Boisot 
2010, p. 442). Informal institutions which were shaped in the previous sys-
tem also influence the efficiency of new formal institutions. However, under 
conditions of high uncertainty, caused also by the incompleteness of consti-
tuted institutions contradictoriness of the stimuli they generate, entities re-
turn to previously formed behaviours that used to work in the past (Platje 
2007, pp. 32-33). In time, the more stable actions of constituted institutions 
decrease the scale of this process. The move from informal non-codified 
laws to formal codified laws is a slow process. 
 
 
Freedom and individualism  
in transition countries 
 
In the face of the initial transformation chaos, the activities of entities were 
burdened with uncertainty. Informal institutions such as “connections” 
formed a specific safety buffer, which was gradually eliminated as the gaps 
in formal institutions were filled and its functions improved. People started 
to see the opportunities of personal gains in not complying with constituted 
norms. More so, the long years of the shortage economy taught people to 
deal with difficulties, also in ways which did not follow the law. Undoubted-
ly, the beginning of the transformation is a period of a strong growth in the 
dynamics of economic activity, which effected in increased scope of eco-
nomic freedom. Attitudes such as “taking matters into one’s own hands” 
snowballed active behaviours directed at the development of the so-called 
private initiative. It would seem that entrepreneurial attitudes became social 
norms, more and more common.  
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One of the basic institutions at the foundation of a market economy is 
economic freedom. The societies of transition counties, in most cases, treat 
freedom as a category of higher importance than equality for the develop-
ment of a country (Graph 1). At the initial stages of transformation people 
demanded more freedom, because it allowed them to fulfil their individual 
goals. Freedom meant separation from the previous system. The years that 
followed revealed numerous faults in the functions of those economies. 
Transition societies found that the new market economy institutions are una-
ble to quickly ensure a stable economic growth and neither do they warrant 
economic security. Privatization, deregulation, and other changes in the for-
mal sphere in the short period did not entail establishing a functional eco-
nomical system. Reality turned out to be different from expectations. New 
economic problems emerged, social conflicts rose. Countries had to deal 
with decreases in production and profit dynamics.  
 
 
Figure 1. Freedom and equality. The percentage of people who indicated that free-
dom is more important than equality in 1990-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own work based on Atlas (30.12.2012). 
 
In many countries, the percentage of people who indicated that freedom 
is more important than equality is grater that 60% in, for example, Great 
Britain, Norway, Sweden, Holland. Among the studied transition countries, 
only Lithuania and Slovakia showed a similar indication. Only two coun-
tries, Poland and Slovakia, demonstrated a growth of this ration in 1990-
2008. The other countries exhibited a growth in the number of people who 
found equality more important that freedom. It seems that the weakening of 
freedom in the hierarchy of values could be caused by a critical assessment 
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of the economic situation, decrease of economic security, increase of risk in 
individual businesses, and growth of the rate of demanding attitudes towards 
the state.  
 
 
Figure 2. Individualism and the state. The percentage of people who believe that the 
state should control firms more effectively* in 1999-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*The surveyed were asked to give their opinion on whether it was necessary for the state to 
intervene in business. The opinion was expressed in a 0-100 scale (0 meaning that the state 
should give more freedom to firms, 100 meaning that the state should exercise more control 
over companies). 
 
Source: own work based on Atlas (30.12.2012). 
 
All of the surveyed countries except Lithuania demonstrated a decrease in 
the percentage of people who believe that state control of business should 
increase (Graph 2). Still, many respondents believe that state should provide 
support for businesses (the highest ratio of such people is in Hungary                   
– 60%). In 2008, 47% of Polish respondents believed that the state should 
control companies more effectively. The others believed that the more free-
dom businesses are left with, the better.  
Most transformation societies hold the belief that they have a bigger in-
fluence on their lives, that they possess freedom of choice and control over 
their lives. Two of the surveyed countries presented a decrease in  the per-
centage of people who believe that the state should control firms more effec-
tively (the Czech Republic and Latvia). In 2008, in all of the surveyed coun-
tries except Latvia (58%) this indicator exceeded 60%, and was the highest 
in Lithuania (67%) and Slovakia (66%) (Graph 3). These numbers are com-
parable with the figures from highly developed European countries. Still the 
highest level is reported from Scandinavian countries – exceeding 70% (75% 
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Denmark, 74% Sweden, 73% Norway and Finland) (Atlas, 30 December 
2012).  
 
 
 
Figure 3. The percentage of people who believe that they have complete freedom of 
choice and control over their lives in 1990-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own work based on Atlas (30.12.2012). 
 
The indicators for Central European and Baltic countries confirm the im-
portance of individualism as a dominant attitude. The disclosure of individu-
alistic attitudes was possible thanks to changes in formal institutions             
– a gradual elimination of barriers connected with business activity. This is 
clearly visible in the rise in position in freedom indices by transition coun-
tries. The largest progress in the freedom index belongs undisputedly to 
Lithuania, which in 1996-2013 advanced by 83 positions in the Heritage 
Foundation ranking, and by 65 position in the Fraser Institute ranking (Table 
1). The other transition countries also achieve better results in creating 
a liberal economic environment.  
The dynamics of freedom indices in those countries is higher than in oth-
ers, resulting those countries progressing in the rankings. In 1990-2013, Po-
land advanced by 56 positions in the Fraser Institutes ranking of freedom of 
conducting business activity, and by 20 positions in the Heritage Foundation 
list (Economic Freedom 2 January 2013); Index of Economic Freedom (10 
January 2013). These processes should be related to the increase in the quali-
ty of institutions.  
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Table 1. Change in the level of economic freedom in transition countries according 
to Heritage Foundation and Fraser Institute in 1995-2013 
 
 Heritage  Foundation 
Index IEF (rank) 
Fraser Institute 
Index EFW (rank) 
2013 (177 
countries) 
1995 (100 
countries) 
2012 (144 
countries) 
1995 (123 
countries) 
Estonia 75,3 (13) 65,2 (26) 7,74 (14) 5,8 (72) 
Czech Rep. 70,9 (29) 67,8 (24) 7,16 (58) 5,7 (73) 
Lithuania 72,1 (29) 49,7 (105) 7,54 (28) 5,2 (93) 
Latvia 66,5 (55) 55,0 (87) 7,12 (61) 5,4 (83) 
Poland 66,0 (57) 50,7(77) 7,31 (48) 5,2 (89) 
Slovakia 68,7 (42) 60,4 (47) 7,45 (33) 5,4 (81) 
Hungary 67,3 (48) 55,2 (63) 7,08 (64) 6,1(61) 
 
Source: own work based on Economic Freedom (2.01.2013); Index of Economic Freedom 
(10.01.2013). 
 
Increase importance of freedom and individualism seems to be a change 
correspondent with the idea of market economy, where egoistic interests are 
the driving force behind the economic mechanism. Individualism is also 
considered to be one of the main factors among informal areas of business 
activities which influences the long term dynamics of the economy (Go-
rodnichenko, Roland 2011,  p. 497). It can be assumed that also in transition 
countries, an increase in individualistic attitudes directed at the realization of 
own goals will also be a beneficial factor for economic growth in the long 
term. 
The position of individualism as opposed to collectivism can be found in 
the analysis of cultural aspects by G.Hofstede. The results of those studies 
indicate a high position of individualism among the studied societies. The 
highest index of individualism was demonstrated by Hungary (80), followed 
by: Estonia (69), Poland (60), the Czech Republic (58), and Slovakia (52). In 
comparison, several highly developed societies present similar results (Ger-
many 67, France 71). However, there are also counties with a much higher 
lead of individualism over collectivism (USA 91, Great Britain 89) (Nation-
al, 3 October 2013). It is therefore clear that the strength of individualistic 
goes in tandem with economic dynamics. 
The increase of economic freedom is a factor promoting entrepreneur-
ship. The communities of transition countries show a successive process of 
growth of the importance of individualism and expressiveness, as demon-
strated in the activity, which gradually replaces conservatism. It does not 
matter whether the attitude towards economic activity changed. People be-
came more active because they knew that more activity could be more bene-
ficial. The increase of freedom became a catalyst of the previously non-
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manifested attitudes. One of the most basic barriers of entrepreneurship in 
planned economies – its penalisation – was removed (Winiecki 2013, 
p. 203). 
 
 
Postmaterialistic values  
in transition countries 
 
Societies in counties with higher incomes are usually more tolerant, open to 
novelty, and trusting. They are more prone to expressive attitudes directed at 
self-expression and realization of individual goals. Citizens exhibit a higher 
participation in social live, contribute to various organizations, and want to 
have an effect on what is happening in their country (Inglehart, Welzel 2009, 
pp. 37-38). An increase in income is accompanied by changes in the system 
of values, and in formal and informal rules that regulate the functioning of 
the society and economy. Inglehart and Welzel’s research conducted on the 
basis of World Values Survey studies indicate that many changes in the sys-
tems of values in post-communist Europe are directed towards post-
materialism observed in Western Europe (Inglehard, Welzel 2009, p. 40).  
The transition of a materialistic society to a postmaterialistic society is 
manifested in their gradual loss of importance economic factors in their 
choices. In the cultural sphere, there is a shift of values – inhibiting, forbid-
ding norms (order, equality, self-discipline, strong subordination to group 
rule) towards liberal values (pluralism, freedom tolerance, openness) (Ryk 
2004, p. 139). Postmaterialistc values also include social confidence, self-
deciding and independence, ecology, minority rights, freedom of choice, 
tolerance, life satisfaction, and self-expression. 
The research conducted by Ronald F. Inglehart and Christian Welzel in-
dicates that a lot of the changes in transformation counties are concurrent 
with the tendencies characteristic of highly developed countries. This trend 
convers increased expansiveness (and, at the same time, decreased conserva-
tism) and dissemination of rationalistic-secular values which replace tradi-
tionalism (Gruszewska 2012, pp. 74-78).  
The transition period saw a clash of two attitudes, and consequently, two 
mechanisms. Groups of people strongly attached to traditionalist values, 
devoted to habits shaped by generations, met with other attitudes - attitudes 
concerned with making money, and therefore connected with the economic 
market. “This struggle must be lost by the followers of traditionalistic val-
ues, as they become easy prey for homo oeconomicus creativus” (Woźniak 
2011, p. 290).  
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Figure 4. Changes in systems of values in transition countries in 1990-2000* 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Poland, GDR, Slovenia, Russia - 1990-2006 , Estonia 1990-1995 
 
Source: Inglehart, Welzel 2010 Supplementary data, based on World Value Survey. 
 
In Poland, compared to other surveyed states, there is a clear and strong 
attachment to traditional, national values. This expresses itself in close fami-
ly ties, strong religiousness and national identity. Although there is an up-
ward shift (increased importance of rational values), the influence of tradi-
tional values on people’s actions remains strong (Graph 4). Among the sur-
veyed countries, Latvia, Hungary, and Estonia  exhibited a growth in the 
importance of traditionalistic values. As for expansionism, which strongly 
affects changes in income (Gruszewska 2012, p. 78), its increase was ob-
served in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia (also in Slovenia). 
Other studies (Institutional Profiles) indicate that transition countries 
demonstrate a decrease of traditionalism, similar to highly developed coun-
tries (Table 2). For example, in Germany and Norway in 2012 this index was 
at 0.0, and in Belgium and Finland it was at 1. It can be said that a large por-
tion of transition societies exhibits a similar index. In Poland there is a no-
ticeably higher solidarity with traditional institutions (family, neighbour-
hood, religion). This attitude, however, is slightly less connected to econom-
ic dynamics than expressionism (Gruszewska 2012, pp. 78-79). On the other 
hand, the same index (3.33) is noted in, for example, Spain or Japan (Institu-
tional 12.10.2013). 
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Table 2. Traditional solidarity index in the analysis of institutional CEPII profiles of 
transition countries in 2001-2012 
 
Year 2001 2006 2012 
Czech Rep. 2,46 2,49 1,00 
Hungary 4,00 2,00 1,33 
Poland 3,46 3,49 3,33 
Lithuania 4,00 3,49 1,33 
Germany 2,46 2,49 1,00 
France 4,00 2,00 1,33 
United States 3,46 3,49 3,33 
 
Source: own work based on Institutional (12.10.2013). 
 
When establishing new institutional systems, transforming countries face 
the barrier of low social confidence. Low levels of confidence are character-
istic of societies whose members are attached to traditional, religious values, 
usually with strong family ties. Such groups are unfavourable of opening to 
innovation, they seldom undertake new challenges and search for creative 
solutions. Low confidence towards others makes it difficult to expand their 
business activity to unknown areas, and is a barrier to establishing coopera-
tion with new partners. In the face of decreasing social confidence, rent-
seeking becomes more prevalent (Woźniak 2011, p. 298). 
Along with increased income per capita, which increases economic secu-
rity, it would seem that trust towards others should also rise. It is usually 
accompanied by evaluated increased probability of gains, and allows for 
a more effective forecast of the behaviours of others (Wang, Gordon 2011, 
p. 584). This is one of the basic indicators of undertaking economic activity. 
In the surveyed period, the percentage of people who trust others in tran-
sition countries decreased in four of them, most prominently in Slovakia and 
Hungary, increased in three countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia and Lat-
via (Graph 5). In most Western European countries, this index is higher, for 
example in Denmark – 76%, Norway – 74%, Sweden – 70%, Finland – 68%, 
Holland – 63%. The scale is at least 2 or 3 times higher than in the surveyed 
countries, and compared to the index in Slovakia, it is 6 times higher.  
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Figure 5. Trust in other people. Percentage of people who agree to the question: 
“can people be trusted?” in 1990 and 2008  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own work based on Atlas (30.12.2012). 
 
Trust in other people is strongly correlated with informal institutions 
(Knowles, Weatherston 2006, p. 5). Higher level of trust allows to undertake 
large scale economic endeavours, enables achieving high economic dynam-
ics. The studied transition countries expressed a lower confidence towards 
others than in highly developed societies. This fact can be treated as a barrier 
for achieving institutional balance. Societies in transformation countries are 
also characterized by low evaluation of formal institutions, and therefore low 
confidence in them. For example, in most of the surveyed societies less than 
40% of the population expressed confidence in the justice system. In 2008 it 
was the lowest in Lithuania (25%) and the highest in Estonia (54%) (Graph 
6). In highly developed European states this index usually sets at more than 
50%, like for example in France or Germany, whereas in Scandinavian coun-
tries it is even higher (exceeding 70%) (Atlas 30 December 2012). 
It must be stressed that the construction of a proper system of law is not 
sufficient to create a stable economic environment. An effective justice sys-
tem is equally important for detecting any derogations from the established 
rules. It is worth noticing how people rate its efficiency and whether they 
have a corresponding confidence in the justice system. The higher the confi-
dence in the fact that law acts as a positive regulator of economic activity 
and that the state is able to efficiently eliminate undesirable behaviours, the 
fewer incongruities between formal and informal institutions. In the face of 
low social confidence, it surely is more difficult to achieve a effective opera-
tion of formal approaches. In Poland and in other transformation states, it is 
not the formal institutions that are the problem, but rather the informal ones. 
People in these societies are still characterised by low political and citizen 
culture. They cannot cooperate to achieve common goals, often because of 
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the lack of confidence. There is a lot more activity in protests against some-
thing than actions directed towards a socially beneficial objective 
(Abramczuk 2012, pp. 260-261). 
 
 
Figure 6. Confidence the justice system. Percentage of people who express confi-
dence in the justice system in 1990 and 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own work based on Atlas (30.12.2012). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The studies conducted in this article allow to conclude that informal institu-
tions in transforming countries have changed in the direction observed in 
highly developed countries. Still, however, they form a barrier in the effi-
cient functioning of formal institutions. The people in these countries are 
still too attached to a state – the institution which is a remedy for every diffi-
culty in economic activity. They are also reluctant to act at their own ex-
pense. A large percentage of people believe that the state should support and 
control business activities (almost 50%). They are not confident in others (on 
average only 25% have confidence in others), and are also characterized by 
a strong attachment to traditionalist thinking, which surely inhibits large 
scale business activities, expanding outside their local areas, and acquiring 
new markets. However, it is noticeable that in most transforming countries 
people believe that they have a large influence on their lives and on the deci-
sions they make (more than 60% of respondents). There is an observed 
growth of expressiveness in most of the presented societies. 
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Changes in informal components of institutions in transformation coun-
tries occur relatively slowly and have not reached a level that could be con-
sidered desirable. The period of the changes is still short. It may well be 
expected that these processes will proceed with similar intensity, allowing 
for a fuller mutual adjustment between formal and informal institutions.  
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